

Summer Assignment 2019: Cambridge AICE History I

Mrs. Lehrman- Stacy.lehrman@browardschools.com

Please write out the responses to the following questions. This should be your own work – not that of your friends and/or classmates. Be prepared to discuss and turn in your work when you return to school in the fall.

I. US History Basic Review – Use any books or online resources to answer these questions. You can access the textbook on Canvas or use any valid source. Be sure to identify where you found your info (the web address will do for online resources).

1. The United States has had two different types of government in its history as an independent nation, each with a different structure
 - a. What was the first government of the independent United States (1781-1789)? What type of government structure was this? Explain. What were the accomplishments and failures of this government?
 - b. What is the second government of the United States (1789 to the present)? What type of government structure does it have? Explain. Why was it called a bundle of compromises?
 - c. Compare & contrast the two governments of the United States. In what ways are they similar? In what ways are they different?
 - d. Compare & contrast the first two party system (Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans) in the US. How did the two party system begin, in what ways were they similar? In what ways are they different? What happened to these two parties?
2. What was the Missouri Compromise of 1820? Why was it so controversial?
3. What new territories did the US gain in the Mexican-American War 1846-1848?

II. Read Ch. 3 of *The Impending Crisis* by David M. Potter –A copy is attached to my summer work. Feel free to print off a copy so that you can annotate the text, as needed.

4. Identify several issues that had divided the North & the South and led to increasing sectionalism ever since the founding of the United States.
5. How did the government structure of the United States contribute to this sectionalism, especially on the issue of slavery?
6. Identify the four basic positions on slavery or “formulas” that the author says emerged as a way of dealing with the issue of slavery in the newly acquired western territories of the US.
 - a. Give a basic description of each position or formula.
 - b. Compare and contrast the four positions or formulas.
 - i. In what ways were they similar?
 - ii. In what ways were they different?
 - iii. If you had to categorize or group the four positions/formulas, how would you do it? Which ones are most similar? Which ones are most different? Explain why you grouped them like you did?
 - iv. Which position/formula seems to you the best way to deal with the issue of slavery in the western territories? Explain your response.

III. Vocabulary– Identify the following terms which are used or referred to in the reading *The Impending Crisis*.

7. Write the definition and significance of the following terms using the time period of 1840s-1850s:
 - a. Sectionalism
 - b. 3/5th Compromise (1780-90s)
 - c. Federalists (1780-90s)
 - d. Jeffersonian Republicans (1780-90s)
 - e. Annexation of Texas
 - f. Wilmot Proviso
 - g. Louisiana Purchase
 - h. Henry Clay
 - i. Popular Sovereignty
 - j. Stephen A. Douglas
 - k. James Polk
 - l. Manifest Destiny
 - m. Free-Soilers
 - n. James Buchanan
 - o. Lewis Cass
 - p. Democrats vs. Whigs
 - q. John C. Calhoun
 - r. Dred Scott decision

If you have any questions, feel free to email me at Stacy.lehrman@browardschools.com. I hope you have a great summer!

selves. Certainly it was not dreamed of in the philosophy of David Wilmot. But from the sultry August night in 1846 when Wilmot caught the chairman's eye, the slavery question steadily widened the sectional rift until an April dawn in 1861 when the batteries along the Charleston waterfront opened fire on Fort Sumter and brought the vigorous force of American nationalism to its supreme crisis.

CHAPTER 3

Forging the Territorial Shears

IF American sectionalism entered a new phase in 1846, it was neither because North and South clashed for the first time nor because the issue of slavery for the first time assumed importance. As early as the Confederation, North and South had been at odds over the taxation of imports and exports, over the degree of risk to be run in seeking navigation rights at the mouth of the Mississippi, and over the taxation of slave property. Once the government under the Constitution went into effect, bitter sectional conflicts raged over the assumption of state debts, the chartering of a central bank, and other matters. This sectional rivalry tended to become institutionalized in the opposing Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican organizations, and it became so serious that Washington issued a solemn warning against sectionalism in his Farewell Address. Later, as the Jeffersonians enjoyed a quarter-century of domination in national politics, they became more nationalistic in their outlook, while Federalist nationalism withered. But no matter which region embraced nationalism and which particularism, sectional conflict remained a recurrent phenomenon.¹

1. For sectionalism before 1820, see John Richard Alden, *The First South* (Baton Rouge, 1961); Edmund Cody Burnett, *The Continental Congress* (New York, 1941), pp. 28, 78, 237-240, 248-258, 433-438, 595-706; Glover Moore, *The Missouri Controversy, 1819-1821* (Lexington, Ky., 1953), pp. 1-32; Staughton Lynd, "The Abolitionist Critique of the United States Constitution," in Martin Duberman (ed.), *The Anti-slavery Vanguard* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 209-239; Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-1820* (New York, 1971).

From the outset, slavery had been the most serious cause of sectional conflict. In the constitutional convention, questions of taxing slave property and of counting it in the basis of representation had engendered intense friction. These quarrels were adjusted, if not resolved, by the three-fifths compromise and other provisions of the Constitution. But more often than not, sectional disagreements were adjourned rather than reconciled. If friction did decrease, it was less because of sectional agreement on the moral question of slavery than because of the general understanding that slavery was primarily a state problem rather than a federal one. Minor contests, sometimes very stubbornly fought, took place over slavery in the District of Columbia, suppression of the international slave trade, and rendition of fugitive slaves.² Later, similar battles were fought over the disposition of antislavery petitions in Congress and the annexation of Texas as a slave state.³

But these were marginal affairs. On the central issue of slavery itself, the locus of decision was the states, which had abolished slavery throughout New England and the Middle Atlantic region while perpetuating it from Delaware south. In the late twentieth century, when federal authority seems to reach everywhere and to be invoked for every purpose, it is difficult to realize that during much of the nineteenth century, state government rather than federal government symbolized public authority for most citizens. Thus, for several decades after the founding of the Republic, the

2. Russel B. Nye, *Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860* (East Lansing, Mich., 1949); William R. Leslie, "The Fugitive Slave Clause, 1787-1842" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1945); W. E. Burghardt DuBois, *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1638-1870* (New York, 1896); Hugh G. Soulsby, *The Right of Search and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American Relations, 1814-1862* (Baltimore, 1933); Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The British Right of Search and the African Slave Trade," *Journal of Modern History*, II (1930), 37-47; Harral E. Landry, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in Atlantic Diplomacy, 1850-1861," *JSH*, XXVIII (1961), 184-207; Warren S. Howard, *American Slavery and the Federal Law, 1837-1862* (Berkeley, 1963); Peter Duignan and Clarence Clendenen, *The United States and the African Slave Trade, 1619-1862* (Stanford, 1963); Stanley W. Campbell, *The Slave Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860* (New York, 1970); Alfred G. Harris, "Lincoln and the Question of Slavery in the District of Columbia," *Lincoln Herald*, LI (1949), 17-21; LII (1950), 2-16; LIII (1952), 11-18; LIV (1953), 12-21.

3. For the gag rule, see chap. 2, note 28. There is apparently no full account of the development of the concept of the "slave power" or "slavocracy," but see Nye, *Fettered Freedom*, pp. 217-249; Chauncey S. Boucher, "In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy," *MPHR*, VIII (1921), 13-79. For the Texas question as a slavery question, see titles cited in chap. 2, note 11.

question of slavery did not naturally come within the federal orbit, and it was only by some special contrivance that even an aspect of it could be brought into the congressional arena. It was this fact and not any agreement on the substantive question that drew the fuse of the explosive issue.

There was one contingency, however, which did transfer the slavery question at once and inescapably to the federal level. This was when the federal government held jurisdiction over western lands, not yet organized or admitted as states, in which the status of slavery was indeterminate. There had been such lands in 1787, but Congress had decided, with only a minimum of sectional disagreement, to exclude slavery from the Northwest Territory by the Ordinance of 1787. South of the Ohio River, Kentucky entered the Union as a slave state without ever being a federal territory, and the western lands that constituted most of the Southwest Territory, or later the Alabama and Mississippi territories, were ceded by North Carolina and Georgia with stipulations that Congress must not disturb the existing status of slavery in those areas. Thus Congress was deprived of what might have been a discord-breeding authority, and the status of slavery was settled throughout the then existing area of the United States.

The disruptive potentialities of territory in an indeterminate status did not become fully apparent until 1820. Missouri had applied for admission as a slave state, thus raising the question of slavery for the whole area of the Louisiana Purchase and presenting the imminent possibility that slave states would outnumber free states in the Union. A violent political convulsion followed, ending with a compromise that settled the territorial issue for another quarter of a century.⁴ During that interval, the bitterness over the gag rule against antislavery petitions and the decade-long struggle over the annexation of Texas (which, like Kentucky, skipped the territorial phase) showed what disruptive forces were ready to burst forth. But the potentiality did not again become an actuality until the prospect of acquiring land from Mexico revived the issue of slavery in the territories, thus returning the problem of slavery to the federal level and making Congress the area of combat for the whole complex of sectional antagonisms. As this situation developed, everyone in politics needed a defined position on the ter-

4. Moore, *The Missouri Controversy*.

ritorial status of slavery, even more than he needed a position on slavery itself. Militants on both sides wanted arguments to justify complete restriction or complete nonrestriction, as the case might be, while those politicians seeking to preserve a measure of national harmony needed formulas to prevent complete victory for either side.

For fifteen years between 1846 and 1861, countless speeches, resolutions, editorials, and party platforms set forth a wide variety of proposals for resolving the territorial issue. But essentially there were four basic positions. Significantly, all four were put forward within sixteen months after the territorial question reemerged to prominence in 1846. For more than a decade thereafter they remained the fixed rallying points of a shifting political warfare. Sometimes opportunists followed a weaving path among the available choices, and in the election of 1848 both major parties contrived to evade them. But sooner or later, almost everyone in public life committed himself to one of the four basic formulas.

The first of these was David Wilmot's—that Congress possessed power to regulate slavery in the territories and should use it for the total exclusion of the institution. This free-soil formula was, in a sense, older than the Constitution, having received its first sanction in the Jefferson-inspired Ordinance of 1787, which declared: "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." This was the language which Wilmot adopted, and so it has sometimes been said that Thomas Jefferson was the real author of the Wilmot Proviso.⁵

Once the Northwest Ordinance was adopted under the Confederation, it remained the basic policy for the Old Northwest under the Constitution. Congress reaffirmed it on August 2, 1789, and again as the successive territories of the region were erected—Indiana (1800), Michigan (1805), Illinois (1809), and Wisconsin (1836).⁶ Thus Presidents Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Monroe, and Jackson all assented to the principle that Congress possessed a constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the territories.

But not everyone who believed that the power existed believed

5. Text of slavery clause in Clarence Edwin Carter (ed.), *The Territorial Papers of the United States* (Washington, 1934-), II, 49; also see chap. 2, note 7.

6. *Ibid.*, II, 203 (Act of 1789); III, 86-88 (Indiana); X, 5-7 (Michigan); *U.S. Statutes at Large*, II, 514-516 (Illinois); V, 10-16 (Wisconsin).

also that it ought to be exercised. Some political leaders embraced the view that the power of Congress should be used in a way that would recognize the claims of both sections. Accordingly, Congress accepted cessions of western land from North Carolina in 1790 and from Georgia in 1802, with the condition that "no regulation made or to be made, by Congress, shall tend to emancipate slaves." It organized the Southwest Territory (out of the North Carolina cession) in 1791 and the Mississippi Territory (originally the northern zone of West Florida, to which the Georgia cession was later added) in 1798, both without restrictions upon slavery. Meanwhile, it admitted Kentucky (separated from Virginia) as a slave state in 1792.⁷ In sum, the federal government did not maintain a uniform policy concerning slavery in the territories, but instead practiced a kind of partition by which the Ohio River became a boundary between free territory to the north and slave territory to the south.

At first this practice was more an expedient or a reflex than a deliberate policy, but it assumed a formal character at the time of the Missouri crisis, which resembled the crisis of the late 1840s in more ways than one. In each case, a free-state congressman offered a motion in the House to exclude slavery from some part of the trans-Mississippi West. Both motions caused divisions along strictly sectional lines; both passed the House and failed to pass the Senate. Each precipitated a crisis that was not settled until a later session of Congress. Each inspired the formulation of an alternative plan making some kind of territorial adjustment between proslavery and antislavery interests. In 1820, Congress adopted the compromise proposed by Senator Jesse Thomas of Illinois, admitting Missouri as a slave state and dividing the rest of the Louisiana Purchase (except the state of Louisiana, already admitted) along latitude 36° 30', with slavery prohibited north of that line. By 1846, this compromise formula had become both familiar and traditional, and within a few minutes after Wilmot introduced his proviso, Representative William W. Wick of Indiana offered a resolution to extend the 36°

7. The various acts of cession by the states, acceptance by Congress, and organization by Congress, all stipulating the protection of slavery or omitting any regulation of it, are in Carter (ed.), *Territorial Papers*, IV, 7, 13 (North Carolina); V, 145 (Georgia); IV, 18 (Southwest Territory); V, 20 (Mississippi Territory); William Waller Hening, *Statutes at Large . . . Virginia* (13 vols.; New York, 1823), XII, 37-40, 240-243, 788-791 (separation of Kentucky from Virginia); *U.S. Statutes at Large*, I, 189 (admission of Kentucky to statehood).

30' line into the prospective Mexican cession.

This principle of territorial division had thus become the second basic formula, and the sanction of solemn agreement between opposing parties was later claimed for it. Actually, it was adopted only because Henry Clay and other compromisers skillfully used two separate majorities to get it passed—one a solid bloc of southerners, with a sprinkling of northern support, to defeat restrictions on slavery in Missouri; the other a solid bloc of northerners, together with slightly more than half of the southern members, to exclude slavery north of 36° 30' in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase. But despite the lack of a clear mandate which would have been necessary to a real covenant, and despite the limitation of this settlement to the Louisiana Purchase, the Compromise had brought peace, and consequently the line 36° 30' later took on a certain aura of sanctity. It was probably for this reason that Wick put it forward so promptly on the night of the Wilmot Proviso.⁸

In the four years between 1846 and 1850, the proposal to extend the Missouri Compromise received a large measure of influential support. The administration rallied to it: Polk, as party leader, urged Democrats in Congress to support it; and the secretary of state, James Buchanan, made it his primary issue in a bid for the Democratic nomination in 1848. In Congress, southern Democrats, although questioning its constitutionality, voted repeatedly to apply it as a basis of settlement, and Stephen A. Douglas, later a champion of popular sovereignty, became its sponsor in the Senate. In July 1848, the 36° 30' line almost became the basis of a compromise proposed by John M. Clayton of Delaware, which had the backing of all the forces of conciliation. To many people in both parties and both sections, the Missouri Compromise seemed to offer the best hope of peaceable adjustment.⁹

To a surprising degree, historians have overlooked the strength of the movement to extend the Missouri Compromise line, and it has become, in a sense, the forgotten alternative of the sectional controversy. History has made heroes of the free-soilers like Lincoln. Douglas has had a body of admirers who argue that popular sovereignty offered the most realistic way of restricting slavery with-

8. For the Wick Resolution, see above, p. 22. On the crisis and settlement of 1820, Moore, *The Missouri Controversy*, supersedes all previous treatments.

9. For efforts between 1846 and 1861 to extend the Missouri Compromise line, see below, pp. 65-66, 69-76, 531-534, 547-551.

out precipitating civil war. And Calhoun has been accorded much respect for the intellectual acumen with which he saw through the superficialities of compromise. But the champions of 36° 30' are forgotten, and even James Buchanan's biographers scarcely recognize his role as an advocate of the Missouri Compromise principle.¹⁰

No doubt this neglect arises primarily from the fact that the proposal to divide the new territory, like the old, along a geographical line was the first of the four alternatives to be discarded in the late 1840s. Perhaps, too, historians have felt that as a simple, unadulterated bargain by which both parties would have given up part of what they believed in, it lacked the ideological rationale to make it interesting. But in a situation in which there were apparently no rational solutions acceptable to both sides, it had already proved to be a remarkably effective irrational solution. If in the end it failed to provide either a nonviolent answer to the slavery question or an enduring peace, no other alternative succeeded better. With it, for more than thirty years, the country had avoided the twin dangers of disruption and war.

Whatever its philosophical defects, the Missouri formula had one ostensible merit that proved more disadvantageous than all its faults. It was free of ambiguity; it spelled out clearly what each side would gain and lose. Thus it did not offer either side the hope of gaining ground by favorable construction of ambiguous language.

While President Polk was supporting the Missouri Compromise plan, the chief aspirant to the presidential succession came forward with a proposal possessing all the charms of ambiguity. The aspirant was Lewis Cass of Michigan, and his "Nicholson letter" of December 1847 formulated the doctrine of what was later called popular sovereignty as a third major position on the territorial question. Without taking a decisive stand on the question of whether Congress possessed power to regulate slavery in the territories, Cass held that if such power existed, it ought not to be exercised, but that slavery should be left to the control—at a stage not clearly specified—of the territorial government. His doctrine was based upon the plausible and thoroughly democratic premise that citizens of the territories had just as much capacity for self-government as citizens

10. George Ticknor Curtis, *Life of James Buchanan* (2 vols.; New York, 1883), does not mention it at all; Philip Shriver Klein, *President James Buchanan* (University Park, Pa., 1962), pp. 200-201, deals with it summarily and without emphasis.

of the states. If it was consistent with democracy to permit the citizens of each state to settle the slavery question for themselves, it would be equally consistent with democracy to permit the citizens of a territory also "to regulate their own internal concerns in their own way." For good measure, this was not only a matter of sound policy, but also of constitutional obligation: Cass did "not see in the Constitution any grant of the requisite power [to regulate slavery] to Congress," and he believed that such regulation would be "despotic" and of "doubtful and invidious authority."

On its face, this position seemed simple and enticing: by invoking the principle of local self-government, against which no one would argue, it promised to remove a very troublesome question from Congress and to make possible a consensus within the badly divided Democratic party. It seemed impartial, in that it challenged both northern and southern partisans to accept the verdict of the local majority.

But either by contrivance or by chance, the popular sovereignty formula held a deeply hidden and fundamental ambiguity: it did not specify at what stage of their political evolution the people of a territory were entitled to regulate slavery. If they could regulate while still in the territorial stage, then there could be "free" territories, just as there were "free" states; but if they could regulate only when framing a constitution to apply for statehood, then slavery would be legal throughout the territorial period, and the effect would be the same as legally opening the territory to slavery. Cass's letter lent itself to the inference that territorial legislatures might exclude slavery during the territorial stage. But his statement that he favored leaving to the people of a territory "the right to regulate it [slavery] for themselves, under the general principles of the Constitution," said far less than it appeared to say, for all that it amounted to ultimately was a proposal to give the territorial governments as much power as the Constitution would allow, without specifying what the extent of this power might be. Cass did state that he saw nothing in the Constitution which gave Congress power to exclude slavery, and this statement implicitly raised a question whether Congress could confer upon territorial legislatures powers that it did not itself possess. But Cass refrained from exploring this implication also. The doctrine of congressional non-intervention, as he first formulated it, was more a device to get the territorial question out of Congress than a solution to

place it definitely in the hands of the territorial legislatures.¹¹

The doctrine of popular sovereignty need not have been so ambiguous. To give it a clearer meaning, Cass needed only to do at the outset what both he and Douglas did later—that is, to assert his belief in the constitutionality as well as the desirability of a system by which the territorial legislatures, rather than Congress, would regulate slavery in the territories. But for nearly two years, Cass avoided this clarification and preserved the ambiguity. This equivocation made the doctrine especially enticing to politicians, for it allowed northern Democrats to promise their constituents that popular sovereignty would enable the pioneer legislatures to keep the territories free, while southern Democrats could assure proslavery audiences that popular sovereignty would kill the Wilmot Proviso and would give slavery a chance to win a foothold before the question of slavery exclusion could arise at the end of the territorial period. Each wing of the party, of course, understood what the other was up to, condoned it as a political expedient for getting Democrats elected, and hoped to impose its own interpretation after the elections were won. But two years beyond each election there was always another election, and a clear confrontation of the meaning of popular sovereignty was repeatedly avoided. The territorial issue, difficult at best and badly needing to be faced with candor and understanding on both sides, thus remained for more than a decade an object of sophistry, evasion, and constitutional hair-splitting, as well as of disagreement.

While middle-ground alternatives to the Wilmot Proviso were being developed by the administration and by Cass, leaders within the slave states had already formulated a fourth major position which was the logical antithesis of the free-soil position. This was the contention that Congress did not possess constitutional power to regulate slavery in the territories and, therefore, that slavery could not be excluded from a territory prior to admission to statehood. Like all major southern doctrines for more than a generation,

11. Cass to Nicholson, Dec. 24, 1847, in *Washington Union*, Dec. 30, 1847. For details concerning the enunciation of the doctrine in 1847-48, see below, pp. 71-72; for the background of popular sovereignty, see Allen Johnson, "Genesis of Popular Sovereignty," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, III (1905), 3-19; for the specific evolution of the doctrine before Cass took it up and for the built-in ambiguity see Milo Milton Quaife, *The Doctrine of Non-Intervention with Slavery in the Territories* (Chicago, 1910), pp. 45-55, 59-77.

this one was more effectively stated by John C. Calhoun than by anyone else. Thus, the accepted formulation appeared in a set of resolutions which Calhoun introduced in the Senate on February 19, 1847. Essentially, these resolutions argued that the territories of the United States were the common property of the several states, which held them as co-owners; that citizens of any given state had the same rights under the Constitution as the citizens of other states to take their property—meaning slaves—into the common territories, and that discrimination between the rights of the citizens of various states in this respect would violate the Constitution; therefore, any law by Congress (or by a local legislature acting under authority from Congress) which impaired the rights of citizens to hold their property (slaves) in the territories would be unconstitutional and void.¹²

According to this reasoning, the Wilmot Proviso would be unconstitutional, and so, for that matter, would the exercise of popular sovereignty by a territorial legislature. These implications, Calhoun intended. But further, his argument plainly meant that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional also, since it embodied a congressional act depriving citizens of the right to carry slaves into the territories north of 36° 30'. This challenge to the constitutionality of the compromise of 1820 was not new. In fact a substantial number of southerners—especially strict constructionists from Virginia—had voted against the act for constitutional reasons when it was originally adopted. But despite his theory, Calhoun was only half-hearted in challenging the 36° 30' line. Embarrassing evidence was brought to light that he had himself supported it in 1820, as a member of Monroe's cabinet, and in any case he regarded it as a fair operating arrangement. In fact, the twenty-ninth Congress witnessed the odd spectacle of Calhoun's loyal follower, Armistead Burt, proposing the extension of the Missouri line in the House, at almost the same time when Calhoun himself was enunciating a doctrine which implicitly challenged the line's constitutionality in the Senate. At this point, he would have been willing to abandon consistency and accept the Missouri line, if the North had been prepared to extend it. But as he saw the Burt proposal voted down by a solid northern majority, his position hardened, and he later became adamant in his insistence that the South must accept noth-

12. *Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 sess., p. 455.

ing less than the full recognition of its literal rights in all the territories.¹³ By 1848, many southerners were asserting that they would never lend their support to a presidential candidate or to a party which advocated any federal law affecting "mediately or immediately" the institution of slavery.¹⁴

Calhoun never pressed his resolutions to a vote, and indeed he had no reason to, for they were certain to be defeated. He had no way of knowing that ten years later, long after any hope of their adoption in Congress had been abandoned, they would be adopted, in somewhat modified form, by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision.¹⁵ What he sought primarily was to state a southern position which would serve as a counterpoise, to unify the South, as the free-soil position was already unifying the North. Historians have not taken sufficient note of the fact that in this effort, Calhoun gained one of the few clear-cut successes of his career. Most of his life was spent in attempts to create political solidarity among southerners, and most of these attempts failed. But the doctrine that Congress could neither exclude slavery from a territory itself nor grant power to a territorial government to do so became one of the cardinal tenets of southern orthodoxy and operated as one of the key elements of southern unity in the crises that were to follow.

The four doctrines championed by Wilmot, Buchanan, Cass, and Calhoun soon became so many converters to be used by men who needed to discuss the slavery question in terms of something other than slavery. In their legal subtleties and constitutional refinements, these doctrines appear today as political circumlocutions, exercises in a kind of constitutional scholasticism designed to concentrate attention upon slavery where it did not exist and to avoid contact with the real issue of slavery in the states. But Thomas Hart Benton

13. See below, pp. 65-66; on the position of Calhoun and other southerners in 1820 concerning the power of Congress to regulate slavery in the territories, see Moore, *The Missouri Controversy*, pp. 46, 63, 122, which finds a majority of southern congressmen conceding the congressional power, but "almost half of them were unwilling to concede even this as a matter of principle, although somewhat more than half would vote for it in the form of a 'hoss trade' compromise," and also Charles M. Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun, Nationalist, 1782-1828* (Indianapolis, 1944), p. 196; Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun, Sectionalist, 1840-1850* (Indianapolis, 1951), pp. 352-353.

14. Resolutions of a meeting at Lowndes, South Carolina, April 14, 1847, quoted in Quaipe, *Doctrine of Non-Intervention*, p. 34.

15. See below, pp. 276-277.

characterized two of the doctrines in a figure of speech which illuminated their functional reality and their historical importance: Wilmot's doctrine and Calhoun's doctrine, he said, were like the two blades of a pair of shears: neither blade, by itself, would cut very effectively; but the two together could sever the bonds of Union.¹⁶

Buchanan's proposal and Cass's concept were intended to prevent the cutting action of the two blades, and for some years they did so. But in all the prolonged and involved legislative battles that embittered the years between 1846 and 1861, the devices to inhibit sectionalism never succeeded for very long. Time and again, the forces which were trying to resist sectional polarization temporarily rallied their followers under the banner of the Missouri Compromise or of popular sovereignty. But invariably the divisions returned, after a while, to the polarities of free soil and of Calhoun's doctrine. The shears continued to cut, deeper and deeper. Thus, although the dispute was to be waged with many variations and many diversionary thrusts, the contest always came back to one of these four doctrinal bases. The dialectic of the crisis of 1860 had been articulated by December of 1847.

16. Thomas Hart Benton, *Thirty Years' View . . . 1820 to 1850* (2 vols.; New York, 1854-56), II, 695-696.

CHAPTER 4

The Deadlock of 1846-1850

DURING the latter half of 1846, American interests in the Far West advanced rapidly. The ratification of the Oregon Treaty in June opened the way for exclusive settlement by Americans south of 49°, and the pioneers promptly organized a provisional government for a future territory. In Alta California, where the Bear Flag Revolt signaled the end of Mexican rule, John C. Frémont, Stephen W. Kearny, and Commodore John D. Sloat and Robert F. Stockton brought the entire region under American control.

In these circumstances, President Polk wanted more than ever to complete the formal processes of acquisition and organization. When Congress met in December he recommended that Oregon be organized as a territory and he again asked for an appropriation (\$3 million instead of the \$2 million that he had failed to obtain in August) with which to acquire title to land from Mexico. Within another year, he would be able to ask for bills to organize territorial governments in California and New Mexico.¹

Despite Whig grumbling, Polk had reason to feel optimistic. The Oregon difficulty had been settled; the war was going well; and the grave nature of the flare-up at the end of the preceding session was not yet recognized. Polk, who temperamentally dis-

1. James D. Richardson (ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (11 vols.; New York, 1907), IV, 457-458, 587-593, 638-639; Eugene Irving McCormac, *James K. Polk* (Berkeley, 1922), p. 61.